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ccsu~ X  v( /3 ABSTRACT 
The  Community  Documentation  Centre  on  Industrial  Risk  CCDCIR)  with 
this  publication  continues  the  review  of  the  national  appraoches  to 
emergency  planning  Csee  also  the  CDCIR  publication  on  Nlessons  learnt 
from  emergencies  after  accidents  in  the  United  Kingdom  involving dan-
gerous  substances",  CDCIR  ref.  No:625-UKb3-I.3,  EUR  13322  EN  Cl990)). 
This  publication  is  based  on  a  study  performed  by  the  Rheinisch-West-
falischer  TUV  on  HOff-site  response  to  accidents  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of  GermanyH.  An  overview  of  the  emergency  response  organiza-
tion  in  the  FRG  based  mainly  on  presentations during  Conferences  on 
Emergency  Planning  for  Industrial  Hazards  and  on  Communicating  with 
the  Public  about  Major  Accident  Hazards,  organized  by  the  CEC  in 
Varese  in  19~7 and  l9H9,  respectively,  has  also  been  included. Preface 
The  Community  Documentation  Centre  on  Industrial  Risk  CCDCIR)  with 
this  publication  continues  the  review  of  the  national  approaches  to 
emergency  planning  Csee  also the  CDCIR  publication  on  Nlessons  learnt 
from  emergencies  after  accidents  in  the  United  Kingdom  involving dan-
gerous  substancesH,  CDCIR  ref.  No:  625-UKb3-I.3,  EUR  13322  EN  Cl990)). 
This  publication  is  based  on  a  study  performed  by  the Rheinisch-West-
falischer  TUV  on  NOff-site  response  to  accidents  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of  GermanyH.  An  overview  of  the emergency  response  organiza-
tion  in  the  FRG  based  mainly  on  presentations during  Conferences  on 
Emergency  Planning  for  Industrial  Hazards  and  on  Communicating  with 
the  Public  about  Major  Accident  Hazards,  organized  by  the  CEC  in 
Varese  in  l9ti7  and  1989,  respectively,  has  also  been  included. 
Similar  studies  have  already  been  initiated  CFrance)  or  are  planned 
for  other  Member  Countries  and  are  going  to  be  performed  by  various 
local  contractors. 
With  reference  to  the  TUV  study  a  copy  of  a  blanc  data collection form 
has  been  added.  Only  point  7  (description  of  acci-
dent/emergency/disaster)  and  point  10  (conclusions  drawn)  for  the  12 
accidents  reviewed  have  been  included  in  this publication. 
The  general  conclusions  drawn  reinforce  the  need  for: 
a)  a  systematic  collection of  response  reports,  lest  valuable  informa-
tion  and  experience  might  not  get  lost; 
b)  a  structured dissemination  of  experience  gained  and  lessons  learnt 
from  handling  emergencies  to  all  interested parties. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  study  of  off-site response  to  accidents  in  the  FRG,  performed  by 
the  Rheinisch-Westfalischer  TUV,  shows  that  no  single  detailed  de-
scription  of  the  emergency  response  organization  in  the  FRG  is pos-
sible;  each  state  eLand)  has  its own  legislation for this  issue  Csee 
e.g.  121  I).  However,  there  are  general  guidelines  at  the  federal 
government  level,  setting  minimum  requirements  and  defining  the 
philosophy  of  the emergency  response  organization  11 I. 
For  a  complete  presentation  of  the study  of  off-site response  to  acci-
dents  in  the  FRG  it  was  felt  necessary  to  present  an  overview  of  the 
emergency  response  organization  in  this country.  This  review  is mainly 
based  on  presentations  during  a  Seminar  on  Emergency  Planning  for 
Industrial  Hazards  1251  and  Conferences  on  Emergency  Planning  for 
Industrial  Hazards  121  and  on  Communicating  with  the  Public  about  Ma-
jor  Accident  Hazards  131,  organized  by  the  CEC  in  Varese  in  1987  and 
1Y89,  respectively,  as  well  as  during  OECD  Workshops.  Consequently, 
the  situation  up  to  the  middle  of  1990  is  reflected  in  the following. 
The  prevailing  safety concept  for  handling  dangerous  substances  in  the 
FRG  based  on  article 2 of the German  Constitutional  Law  CGrund  Gesetz) 
requires  that  such  installations  should  not  create  according  to the 
available  knowledge  any  risk to  the  public  14,161.  The  residual  risk 
due  to  lack  of  knowledge  has  to  be  borne  by  the  community  as  a  general 
social  weight  Csozialadaquate  Lasten)  1161.  Consequently,  whenever 
dangerous  substances  are  employed,  their substitution  by  innocuous  or 
at  least  less  harmful  ones  11,51  is demanded.  If this is  impos~Jble,  a 
hazard  analysis  has  to  be  performed  according  to the  requirements  of 
the  Regulation  of  Major  Industrial  Accidents  CAllgemeine  Verwaltungs-
vorschrift  zur Storfallverordnung  -Regulation  applying  the  SEVESO-
Directive  in  the  FRG).  Based  on  this  analysis  a  comprehensive,  inte-2 
grated  three-stage  safety  concept  has  to  be  developed  which  consists 
of  11 I: 
Stage  1:  measures  in  the  installation which  assure  the  safe eontain-
ment  of  dangerous  substances  and  the  prevention  of  inadmis-
sible operating conditions; 
Stage  2:  measures  designed  to  limit the effects  of  fire,  explosion  or 
release  of chemicals  which  might  occur  as  the  result of  a 
major  accident; 
Stage 3:  measures  taken  off-site  to  protect  the  surroundings  and 
limit  the effects  of  harmful  substances,  heat  radiation  or 
consequences  of  an  explosion  on  the objects to  be  protected. 
The  first  two  stages  are  the  basic  requirements  for on-site emergency 
planning;  the third  one  for  off-site emergency  planning.  Density  of 
installations  handling  hazardous  substances  in  the  FRG  as  shown  in 
Figure  1  underlines  the  importance  of  off-site emergency  planning  for 
a  substantial  part of this country. 
A  brief presentation  of  available  aids  for on-site emergency  planning 
and  the  evolution  under  the  influence of  the SEVESO-Directive  of  the 
general  guidance  for off-site emergency  planning  and  for  risk communi-
cation  to  the  public will  be  briefly presented.  A few  considerations 
will  be  included  on  the  important  aspects  of  interphase  between  on-
iste  and  off-site  emergency  plans  and  of  exercises  and  auditing  of 
emergency  plans. 3 
2.  ON-SITE  SAFETY  PRECAUTIONS 
On-site  safety precautions  have  to  be  designed  to  prevent  majpr  acci-
dents  to  occur  or,  if  they  do  occur,  to mitigate their consequences. 
Basic  requirements  for  safety precautions  are  included  in  11 I: 
- state  regulations,  e.g.  the Commercial  Activity Act  CGewerbeordnung) 
and  the  regulations  issued  under  it, the  Federal  Emission  Control 
Act  and  its  Regulation,  the  Chemical  Act,  the Dangerous  Machinery 
Act,  etc.; 
-guidelines  made  by  the employer's  liability insurance  associations 
(accident prevention  stipulations); 
-trade associations  Ce.g.  DIN,  Vdt,  VOl,  VDE)  guidelines; 
- internal  company  regulations  and  guidelines. 
Major  chemical  companies  had  Hazard  Protection  Plans  Con-site  emer-
gency  plans)  drawn  up  even  before  application of the Regulation  on  Ma-
jor  Industrial  Accidents  161.  According  to  the  requirements  of  this 
regulation,  new  Hazard  Pretention  Plans  that  have  to  be  drawn  up  or 
existing  ones  that  have  to  be  adjusted,  must  cover  all  potential  on-
site  hazards  Ce.g.  fire,  explosion,  accident)  and  off-site  hazards 
Ce.g.  malfunctions  in  neighbouring  plants,  collisions) must  name  on-
site  safety facilities  and  must  specify special  behavioural  measures 
for  the  plant  staff in  the event  of  an  emergency  16,151. 
Hazard  minimization  by  proper  design,  instrumentation  and  control 
systems,  maintenance  and  training of  the  personnel  are  the principal 
requirements  of  the  Regulation  of  Major  Industrial  Accidents  115,161. 
However,  plans  have  also  to  be  made  for mitigation  of  the consequences 
of  accidents  especially  if the  potential  of  a  public  hazard  Chazard 
for  the  life  or  the  health  of  persons  outside  the  establishment  or 
material,  social  or  environmental  damage  outside the  establishment) 
exists. 
The  Hazard  Protection  Plan  should  normally  have  a dual  function: 
a)  enable  senior staff  of  the plant  to  react  promptly  in  the  event  of 
an  emergency; 
b)  be  used  for  plant staff training  and  drills. 
Ideally,  the  Hazard  Protection  Plan  should  be  drawn  up  by  the  person 
responsible  for  the  plant  in  cooperation  with  the Fire  Protection  and 
Occupational  Safety departments  and  must  be  updated  whenever· neces-
sary.  A typical  Hazard  Protection  Plan  consists of  two  parts  161:  an 
organizational  section  Cgiving  a  list  of  actions  describing  the  be-
haviour  to  be  adopted  in  the event  of  emergencies)  and  an  informa-4 
tional  one  Cgiving  an  overview  of  the  plant - process  description, 
block  flow  diagrams,  building  plans  -,  the  associated  hazards 
hazardous  substances,  hazardous  areas,  sources  of  hazards  - and  the 
safety  equipment  and  systems).  Big  complexes  may  have  various  Hazard 
Protection  Plans  for  various  installations  in  the  same  site;  then  an 
overall  Hazard  Protection  Plan  of  the  works  is required  for coordinat-
ing  notification/alarming  process  and  decisions/actions  affecting 
several  managerial  areas. 
It  is recognized  by  the  industry that  properly drawing  up  plans  en-
hances  plant  safety  161. 
Plant  operators  are  also  involved  in  emergency  planning  since  the 
plant  committees  CBetriebsrate)  should  endorse  the on-site emergency 
and  alarm  plans  1181. 
Furthermore,  the  safety reports  shall  be  made  available on  request  and 
accident  notification  shall  be  communicated  without  any  delay  to them 
11  ~I . 5 
3.  OFF-SITE  SAFETY  PRECAUTIONS 
Location  of  the  industry and  keeping  of  separation  zones  bet~een in-
dustrial  and  residential  areas  are essential  steps for off-site safety 
11,71.  Further emergency  plans  specifying  alarm  paths  and  behaviour 
instructions  have  to  be  developed  11  I.  The  importance  of  careful  on-
site  and  off-site  emergency  plans  and  a  clear definition of  responsi-
bilities  in  the  case  of emergency  is  underlined  in  the  general  guide-
lines. 
Originally,  emergency  response  and  contingency  plans  were  based  on 
lessons  learnt from  previous  events,  which  were  mainly  natural  dis-
asters  (floods,  large fires,  avalanches,  earthquakes,  etc.)  181.  These 
plans  were  mainly  aiming  to  provide  aid  for combating  disasters,  res-
cue  and  care  of  the population  and  selection  and  training of  suitable 
rescue  personnel.  The  same  process  has  been  also  initially followed 
for  industrial  accidents,  i.e.  updating  emergency  plans  according  to 
aftermath  of  serious  accidents.  Specific disaster management  planning 
was  first undertaken  to  cover  radiation  hazards  with  the  introduction 
of  nuclear  power.  Major  accidents  in  the  chemical  industry,  in  con-
junction  with  the  fact  that  process  industry  is  rather developed  in 
the  high  population  density  FRG,  led  the Federal  Office for  the Envi-
ronment  in  Berlin  in  1981  to  have  a  study  performed  by  the Rheinisch-
Westfalischer  TUV.  Interviews  of  plants,  authorities  and  competent  as-
sociations  and  literature review  were  used  to evaluate  18,171: 
- structure and  content  of  disaster  response  plans; 
-characterisation of  hazard  potential; 
-cooperation  between  plant  operators  and  authorities; 
- organisations  involved,  equipment  and  aids  available; 
- section  strategies  (situation  evaluation,  public  alerting,  traffic 
control,  evacuation,  assistance); 
- instructions  and  decision-making  aids  to  emergency  planners  and 
disaster services;. 
The  legal  framework  for off-site  emergency  planning  and  response  is 
based  on  18,201: 
a)  the  Disaster Response  Act  CKatastrophenschutz-Gesetz)  and  the  asso-
ciated  regulation  on  a  federal  and  state  (Lander)  level; 
b)  the Federal  Anti-Pollution  Act; 
c)  the  Incidents  Ordinance  Cl2th  Bim  SchV)  and  the Regulations-on  Ma-
jor Industrial  Accidents. 6 
This  legal  framework  offers  a  substantial  prerequisite for  an  effec-
tive  emergency  planning;  however,  the  development  of  specific emer-
gency  plans  is  highly  influenced  by  the persons  involved  in  it_and  the 
local  peculiarities  (especially  organisational  level  and  availability 
of  equipment).  Using  the general  principles  of  emergency  planning, 
specific  emergency  plans  have  to  be  developed  taking  into  account  the 
characteristics  of  the  hazard  sources,  the  vulnerability  of  the 
objects  to  be  protected,  the  population  density  and  distribution, 
traffic  routes  and  infrastructure,  orographic  and  prevailing meteoro-
logical  conditions.  Specific  emergency  plans  can  be  developed  based  on 
the  dynamic  prinicple  Conly  general  preplanning  relying  on  a  high 
flexibility  and  the capacity of  decision making  of  the  emergency  mana-
gement  centres)  or  on  a  very detailed  preplanning  or  any  variation  in 
between  these  two  extremes  1171. 
Guidelines  for  a  uniform  emergency  planning  were  also developed  in 
this  study.  Efficient  specific emergency  plans  must  be  1171: 
a)  simple  and  clear; 
b)  unambiguous; 
c)  complete  Cnot  necessarily  foreseeing  all  details  but  keeping  the 
balance  between  giving  adequate  information  on  all  potential 
implications  and  leaving  adequate  flexibility for facing  unforeseen 
developments). 
Emergency  plans  shall  be  drawn  117,191: 
a)  considering  the  organisational  level,  the  alerting  and  intervention 
capabilities,  availability  of  equipment  and  rescue/intervention 
personnel; 
b)  trying  to  achieve  a  good 
manufacturers  (exchange 
assistance); 
c)  analysing  the  hazards 
consequences; 
cooperation  between 
of  information, 
authorities  and 
alerting,  mutual 
of  accidents  and  their  potential 
d)  establishing  necessary  intervention  means  and  actions  (alerting of 
intervention  teams,  estimation  and  verification  of  consequences, 
risk  communication  to  the  public,  alternative plans  for traffic, 
public  protection,  medical  treatment,  evacuation,  etc.). 
In  general,  emergency  plans  should  be  applicale for  accidents  i~ fixed 
installations  and  transportation of  dangerous  substances  1171. 
Emergency  plans  must  adequately  cover  all  phases  of  an  accident 
development  such  as  1201: 7 
a)  the quick  identification of  the  endangered  area; 
b)  warning  of  public  and  closure of  the  endangered  area; 
c)  verification of  the extent  of  consequences  of  the  accident;  -
d)  care for  injured  persons; 
e)  evacuation  Cif  necessary  - see  also  point  4 below); 
f)  decontamination/cleaning  of the  affected  area. 
Disaster  Response  Acts  contain  also  examples  of  contents  of  emergency 
p  1  ans  1211 • 
In  ,some  states  Clander)  such  as,  for  example,  in  Baden-WUrttemberg, 
the  industry bears  at  least partially the cost of  equipment  and  works 
necessary for  implementation  of  emergency  plans  1191. 4.  EXAMPLE  OF  SPECIFIC  OFF-SITE  EMERGENCY  PLANT  CStorfallverordnung) 
On  this  basis  local  Fire  Brigade,  Rescue  Services  and  Civil _Defence 
drew  up  emergency  plans  for  each  administrative  district  161.  As  an 
example,  the  specimen  plan  that  has  been  introduced  by  the  President 
of  the Cologne  regional  administration  as  a guideline for drawing  up 
Emergency  Plans  for  this  administrative district is briefly described 
hereafter  161: 
The  Emergency  Plans  are  kept  by  the competent  distric disaster preven-
tion  authority Ce.g.  Town  Clerk,  District Clerk)  and  contain  informa-
tion  required  for  implementing  measures  to protect  the  public  in  the 
event  of  a  catastrophe.  Emergency  Plans  are only  intended  for  use  in 
conjunction  with  the  general  disaster protection  plan  of  the authori-
ties  and  the  alarm  plan  of  the  operator.  The  Emergency  Plans  are  up-
dated  annually  by  the district disaster prevention  authority. 
The  Emergency  Plan  is  compiled  in  the form  of  checklists  and  consists 
of  five  sections: 
1)  Description  of  the object. 
2)  Reporting  and  alarm-raising  paths. 
3)  Immediate  actions  in  the  event  of  an  emergency: 
3. l  establishing the  type  of  hazard 
3.2  establishing the  endangered  area 
3.3  measuring  the  gas  concentration 
3.4  warning  and  informing  the  public. 
4)  Follow-up  actions. 
5)  Appendices. 
These  items  cover  the  essential 
Leverkusen  Model.  Nearly  25%  of 
cal  substances  is  located  in 
19,13,201.  Preventive  evacuation 
studied  and  planned  because  of 
(requirements  in  transportation 
evacuated,  etc.)  18,91. 
elements  of  what  is  known  as  the 
the  total  German  production  of  chemi-
the  industrial  region  of  Cologne 
of  large  areas  has  to  be  carefully 
the  difficulties  in  implementation 
means  and  personnel,  settling down  of 
The  DIN  data  sheets  COIN  52900- given  in  Attachment  1)  that 
be  filled  in  by  the  manufacturers  have  been  very  helpful 
have  to 
for  the 
authorities  in  evaluating  dangers  caused  by  substances  and  prepara-
tions  as  well  as  in  the  choice  of  preventive  measures. 9 
5.  MAJOR  ACCIDENT  NOTIFICATION 
Manufacturers  are  obliged  to alert  the  authorities  in  the  ~ase  of 
major  accidents  by  the  Law  of  Fire Protection,  the  Law  on  Contingency 
Planning  and  the  Regulation  on  Major  Accidents  191.  There  are  also 
regulations  at  state  level  defining  accident  notification oblications 
and  the  content  of  the notification  Csee  e.g.  1221  for  North  Rhenania 
Westphalia).  Installations falling  under  the SEVESO-Directive  require 
a  uniform  incident  notification  system  by  means  of  the  standard  form 
shown  in  Attachment  2.  In  part D  of  this  form,  manufacturers  are 
required  to  classify  the  abnormal  event.  According  to  this 
classification,  actions  are  to  be  taken  and  various  groups  Csee 
Attachment  3  for the  definition of  these  groups)  are  to  be  alerted  as 
follows  19,201: 
Step  1:  Signifies  an  internal  irregularity,  for  example  a  minor  re-
lease  of toxic  gas,  a  small  fire or  a failure  in  the control 
system  which  causes  an  abnormal  situation. 
Action:  The  firefighting forces,  the  police  and  the  local  authorities 
are  alarmed.  No  alert is  given  to the  public  and  no  measures 
are  to  be  taken  off-site. 
Step  2:  Signifies  an  internal  danger  with  the  possibility of  a threat 
to  the  internal  staff,  but  not  for  the  public  or  the  environ-
ment.  Examples  are  a  runaway  reaction,  overheating  of  a  pres-
sure  vessel  or  a  small  release of  toxic  substances. 
Action:  Besides  the fire brigades  and  the police on  duty,  the  heads  of 
their  regional  offices  are  informed  and  go  into  a  stand~by po-
sition  Csilent  alarm).  In  the case  of  disturbing  signals from 
the  site,  e.g.  a fume  column,  smell,  noise  from  explosions, 
but  no  real  danger  occurs,  the public  would  be  informed. 
Step  3:  Is  announced  if  the danger  spreads  off-site.  An  impact  of  the 
public  or  the  environment  is  likely.  Examples  are  the  release 
of  a  toxic  cloud  which  leaves  the  limits of  the installation, 
or  a major  fire which  spreads  toxic  fumes  throughout  the 
neighbourhood. 
Action:  Additional  alarm  groups  Cgroups  III-V,  referring  to  Attach-
ment  3)  are  informed  and  go  into  a  stand-by  position.  The 
Emergency  Operation  Centre  CEOC)  and  the Technical  Field  Head-
quarters  CTFH),  which  are  uniformly  organized  under  the  German 
Law  on  Contingency  Planning,  are  activated to  a  stand-by  posi-10 
tion.  Some  public  emergency  forces  take  action  in  response  to 
the  accident.  The  common  public  is  informed  by  radio;  the 
public  which  is directly endangered  is  instructed  by  r~dio and 
patrol  cars with  loudspeakers. 
Step  4:  Is  the catastrophic  level.  The 
trolled  by  the  on-site forces; 
the public  or  the environment. 
accident  is  no  longer  con-
there is  a  severe danger  for 
Action:  The  accident  is  classified as  a disaster.  The  EOC  and  TFH  is 
fully  operable  and  takes  over  the  guidance  of  all  response 
forces.  All  groups,  including· group  VI  and  VII  if necessary, 
are  alarmed.  The  informing  of  the  public  takes  place  with 
standardized  radio  messages  in  a  broad  manner.  Directly 
affected  people  are  also  instructed  through  patrol  cars with 
loudspeakers. 
If  appropriate,  an  evacuation  is preplanned  for  each  particular site. 
The  decision  to  evacuate  or  not  is  supported  by  a decision flowsheet 
19,10 I. 
The  system  has  run  in  the centres of  the chemical  industry in  the  FRG 
for  over  ten  years.  It  works  sufficiently  well.  The  main  problem  in 
the  start-off phase  was  the organization of  reliable  information  chan-
nels  between  the operator  and  the fire  brigades.  In  the  industrial  re-
gion  of  Cologne  there  are  uniform  treaties  between  the Cologne  Fire 
Department  and  all  hazardous  installations of  the Seveso-type.  Within 
these  treaties,  the  above-mentioned  notification  system  is fixed  and 
direct  telephone  lines  to  the  central  fireguard  are  switched  on  191. 
Combination  of  serens,  radio  and  patrol  cars  with  loudspeakers  is used 
to  inform  and  alert the  public  1201.  Serens  neither do  identify the 
source  of  hazard  nor  the  area  affected  and  create  an  extensive wave  of 
telephone  calls to  police  and  firebrigade which  can  block  telephone 
lines.  On  the  other hand,  serens  are  very  useful  during  night  for 
waking  up  the  public,  who  then  should  look  for  more  precise 
instructions  through  the  radio.  Patrol  cars  with  loudspeakers  are 
effective  both  for  waking  up  and  giving  precise instructions  to the 
public. 11 
6.  RISK  COMMUNICATION  TO  THE  PUBLIC 
An  effective implementation  of  emergency  plans  requires  that  the 
public  that might  be  affected  in the case of  a major  accident  is  in-
formed  on  the  nature  of  the danger  and  the proper  behaviour  according 
to  the  requirements  of  article 8 of  the SEVESO-Directive  Cas  has  been 
modified  after the  2nd  amendment  of this Directive).  Especially in  the 
FRG  after  the  catastrophic  accidents  in  Bhopal,  Tschernobyl  and 
Sandoz,  there is  an  increased  pressure from  the public  for  getting 
more  information  on  the  various  major  accident  hazards  and  the 
emergency  plans  1241. 
In  the  FRG  the public  is  supposed  to  be  informed  already  before 
licensing  for operation  is  granted  to  an  installation.  According  to 
the  Federal  Immission  Control  Act  the  manufacturer  is  obliged  to 
present  to  the  local  authorities  a  number  of  documents  Csee 
Attachment  4)  Ill I.  The  application  is made  known  to the public  by  the 
local  authorities  through  announcement  in  its official  journal  and  in 
daily  newspapers.  Any  citizen  has  the  right  to  review  all  the 
documents  required  for  the  application  for  licensing  except  those 
concerning  business  or  trade  secrets. 
If  judicial  remedies  are  exhausted  it may  take years  until  a final  de-
cision  on  an  application  is  taken.  Hence,  the operators  deplore  this 
fact  as  a  barrier to  investment  Ill I.  The  authorities  receive  on  the 
average  every  three to five years  notification due  to modifications  of 
installations  or  processing  materials;  consequently,  the  latest 
information  on  the  actual  hazard  potential  is  made  available·to the 
public  every  three  to five years. 
Modification  of  the  regulations  implementing  the SEVESO-Directive  in 
the  FRG  in  order  to  include  the  requirements  of  risk communication  to 
the  public,  as  has  been  set out  in  article 8 of  the Directive after 
its  second  amendment,  was  planned  for  1990.  Some  manufacturers  ex-
pressed  reservations  considering  that  communication  to  the public  of 
potential  dangers  from  installations could  be  taken  as  contradictory 
to  the  requirement  of  the  Federal  Immission  Control  Act  according  to 
which  licensing  is  granted  to  an  installation provided  that it creates 
no  danger  to the  public  1121. 
Before 
gency 
1990,  local  authorities  within  the framework  of  off-site emer-
response  preparedness  distributed to  the  public  leaflets with 12 
instructions  for  the  proper  behaviour  in  the case  of  an  emergency.  An 
example  of  such  a  leaflet  and  the  accompanying  letter,  both  translated 
in  English,  is  given  as  Attachment  5  Ill I.  A copy  of  the  ~riginal 
leaflet,  distributed  in  the  area  of  the city of  Cologne,  is  also  given 
as  Attachment  6.  The  states  (Lander)  would  prefer  that  the  manu-
facturers  themselves  fulfil  the obligation  to  inform  the  public  on  po-
tential  dangers  in  consultation with  the  responsible  authorities  Ill I. 13 
7.  EMERGENCY  PLAN  EXERCISES  AND  AUDITING  1131 
Should  an  emergency  escalate to  step  3 or 4  Csee  paragraph  5)_ and  the 
units  of  the  Disaster  Prevention  Service  must  be  alerted or  brought 
in,  an  Emergency  Operation  Centre  is created  eEOC  or  Katastrophen-
schutzleitung  - KSL).  This  operation  staff group  consists  of officers 
of  the professional  fire  brigade  together  with  the  directors  of 
various  city offices  such  as  the Health  Office or  the  Press  Office.  It 
also  includes  members  of  state  agencies  such  as  the  police  and  mili-
tary  services  and  Cif  necessary)  members  of private companies.  Depend-
ing  on  the  situation at  the  site  of  the  emergency,  one  or several 
Technical  Field Headquarters  CTFH  or  Technische  Einsatzleitung -TEL) 
are  established.  They  consist of  an  officer of  the professional  fire 
brigade  together with  a  small  operation  staff  and  they  direct  the 
units  that  have  been  put  under  their command. 
In  order  to  assess  the  effectiveness of  emergency  plans,  every city 
has  to  perform  exercises mostly  in  cooperation  with  the  industry, 
which  also  covers  partially the  cost  of  such  exercises  1191;  in  the 
state  CLand)  of  North-Rhine-Westphalia  they  must  carry out  a disaster 
prevention  exercise at  least  twice  a year.  These  exercises must  be  di-
rected  to  specific  local  risk factors,  should  enable  a  realistic simu-
lation  of  a  disaster and  also  the  testing of  disaster prevention  mea-
sures.  They  should  include  the following  procedures: 
1)  notification  of  the  management  and  units  of  the  Disaster Prevention 
Service  and  other  agencies; 
2)  communication  between  the  EOCs,  the  subordinate  TFHs,  the  super-
visory  authority and  other state  agencies  and  Cif  necessary)  pri-
vate companies; 
3)  situation  assessment  and  decision  making  by  the operation  staff; 
4)  the  execution  of  measures  such  as  warning,  evacuating  and  assisting 
large  numbers  of  injured  people. 
Three  types  of  exercise can  be  performed  depending  on  the  specific 
aim: 
alarm  exercise; 
- staff exercise; 
- complete  exercise. 
Any  combination  of  these exercise  types  is  also  possible.  The  alarm 
exercise  is  intended  for  verifying  the time  interval  between  alarming 
and  the  ·ready  for  action·  state.  A staff exercise is only  performed 
by  the operation  staff while  the  units  at  the disaster scene  are  simu-14 
lated.  During  a complete  exercise  the  EOCs,  TFHs  and  all  units  perform 
the  exercise  in  a  simulated  emergency  situation. 
Staff  exercises  are most  frequently  performed.  Alarm  exercises_for the 
4500  assistants of  the  Disaster  Prevention  Service  in  Cologne  only 
take  place  once  every  3 years.  Complete  exercises  are only  performed 
approximately  once  every  5 years  due  to  the  extensive  preparations 
necessary. 
The  main  conclusions  of  the  exercises carried out  that  are  also  sup-
ported  by  the experience  gained  from  accidents  1141  are: 
- The  notification of  leading  staff memebers  and  units of  the Disaster 
Prevention  Service must  be  done  by  sirens  or  by  using  a  collect call 
for  radio  receivers;  alarm  by  telephone  requires  too  much  time  and 
is  less  effective. 
- Plans  must  also  be  made  for employing  units  with  only  5~/o of  their 
personnel. 
- Radio  communications  networks  are  often  overloaded  or  even  jammed 
during  the  early  stages  of  an  emergency.  They  are  also frequently 
used  by  reporters.  Mobile  telephones  or  use  of  private  telephone 
lines  with  secret  telephone  numbers  so  that  they  cannot  be  blocked 
by  calls from  the  public  are  necessary for  EOCs  and  TFHs. 
-Since  TFHs  are  overloaded,  especially during  the  early stages  of  an 
emergency,  it may  take  45  minutes  or  more  before  EOC  receives  a 
first  detailed  report.  Therefore,  EOC  should  have  their own  scouts 
that  can  report  from  the scene  of the emergency.  Direct  video  camera 
transmission,  even  from  a  helicopter,  into the  control  centre has 
proven  to  be  very  efficient. 
Management  groups  can  only  work  efficiently if  they  are  kept  as 
small  as  possible.  The  positions  and  tasks  within  the  group  must  be 
defined  beforehand  to  allow for  proper  preparation  and  practicing. 
Every  position must  be  occupied  by  two  persons  to enable  shift work 
during  longer  duration  emergencies. 
- Good  cooperation  within  management  groups  and  between  management 
groups  and  private  chemical  companies  is  essential.  Exchange  of 
staff  members  with  members  of  the factory management  as  liaison of-
ficers  has  proven  to  be  very  effective. 
Chemical  companies  are  very  cooperative  in  exercises  simulating 
transport  accidents  inside  or  in  the direct  vicinity of  the  factory 
area,  but  reluctant  to  simulate  an  accident  in  a  production  or 
storage  area. 
- Special  attention  has  to  be  paid  to  factories  located  on  the 
boundary  between  neighbouring  cities since,  in  addition,  coordina-15 
tion  and  cooperation  of  the  management  groups  is  required.  Single 
planning  and  protection  responsibility of  the city where  the  larger 
potential  is  located  is the  preferred  alternative.  Tasks,  ]nforma-
tion  exchange  and  responsibilities must  be  defined  precisely in  ad-
vance. 
- Use  of  loudspeaker-equipped  vehicles  for  alerting the public  has  ex-
tensively  been  tested  in  the Cologne  area  and  the  results  have  been 
used  as  a  basis  for  planning.  Eighty-four  fire brigade  vehicles, 
which  are  either permanently  occupied  or which  can  be  employed  imme-
diately,  were  equipped  with  loudspeakers,  cassette tape  decks  and 
prerecorded  cassette tapes.  However,  the  success  of  a combined  alarm 
using  sirens,  radio  broadcoast  and  loudspeaker  vehicles  is not  known 
as  this  combination  has  not  yet  been  tested.  Such  an  exercise would 
require  a  large  amount  of  participation from  the general  public. 16 
8.  CONCLUSION 
-
Emergency  planning  in  the  FRG  is  based  on  the  experience  gained  from 
accidents.  Regular  exercises  and  close cooperation  with  chemical  com-
panies  are  used  to  improve  the  emergency  response  preparedness,  espe-
cially in  centres with  a  high  concentration  of  industrial  activities. 
In  rural  areas,  however,  emergency  plans  may  be  still  inadequate  and 
disaster  control  teams  may  be  ill-equipped  and  inadequately trained 
11 I . 
There  are  several  problems  of  legal  and  technical  nature  which  can  be 
observed  in  practice  regarding  emergency  plans  ll I  and  more  work  is 
required  to  provide  frank  and  comprehensive  information  to the public 
on  potential  dangers  11,11, 121. 17 
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Fig.l:  Density  of  installations  covered  by  the  requirements  of  the 
SEVESU-Oirective  C82/501/EEC)  in  the  FRG  in  1987. 
Sources  19,231. ATTACHMENT  1 
Date: 
DIN  safety data  sheet 
Division: 
Commercial  product  name:  -
1.1  Chemical  characterization: 
1.2  Form:  1.3  Colour:  1.4  Odour: 
2.  Physical  data  and  safety  data  Tested  1n  accordance  Wlth: 
2.1  Change  in  physical  state 
oc 
oc 
3 
2.2  Density  (  oc)  g/cm3 
Bulk density  kg/m 
2.3  Vapour pressure  (  oc)  mbar 
(  oc)  mbar 
2.4  Viscnsity  (  oc) 
2.5  Solubility  in  water  (  OC)  g/1 
in  ·  (  oc)  g/1 
2.6  pH  value  (at  g/1  H20)  (  oc) 
2.7  Flash  point  oc 
2.8  Ignition temperature  oc 
2.9  Explosion  limits  Lower:  Upper: 
2.10  Thermal  decomposition 
2.11  Hazardous decomposition  products 
2.12  Hazardous reactions 
2.13  Further information 
3.  Transport  GGVSee/IMOG  code:  UN  No.:  ICAO/IATA-OGR: 
GGVE/GGVS:  RIO/AOR:  AONR: 
Other information: 
4.  Regulations 
--
-
. 
I ,-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
j Commercial  product name 
5.  Protective measures,  storage and  handling 
5.1  Technical  protective measures 
5.2  Personal  protective 
equipment 
5.3  ·Industrial  hygiene 
Respiratory  protection: 
Hand  Protection: 
5.4  Protection  against  fire  and explosion 
5.5  Disposal 
Eye  protection: 
Other:  · 
- ------------------·--------------------------------------------------------------~ 
I 6.  Measures in  case  of accidents and  fires 
6.1  After  spillage/leakage/gas leakage 
6.2  Extinguishing  media  Suitable: 
Not to  be used: 
6.3  First  aid 
6.4  Further  information 
7.  Information on  toxicity 
8.  Information on  ecological effects 
9.  Further information 
DIN  52900 - T!:e  data grven  here are based on current knowledge and  expenence. 
The  purpose of  th1s  Safety Data Sheet  1s  to descnbe the  products in  terms of their  safe~y requirements. 
The  data do not  srg •. tfy  any warranty v.1th  regard to  the  products·  properttes. ATTACHMENT  2  CSource  IY,lOI) 
PRELIMINARY  NOTIFICATION  UF  A MAJOR  ACCIDENT 
Installation: 
Substance: 
Amount: 
Wind: 
- direction: 
- speed: 
A  Classification 
1.  On-site 
2.  Off-site 
C  Effect off-site 
1.  Smell  molestation 
1.1  not  excluded 
1.2  expected 
1.3  no  longer  expected 
Date: 
Time: 
Office  of  reception: 
Message  received  at: 
8  Character 
1  .  1  eakage 
2.  runaway  reaction 
J.  fire 
4.  explosion 
2.  Danger  for  life and  health  through  gas  clouds 
2.1  not  excluded 
2.2  expected 
2.3  not  expected 
3.  Uanger  of  an  explosion 
3. 1  not  exc 1  uded 
j.2  expected 
3.3  not  expected 
3.4  no  longer  expected 
U  Notification - expected  reactions 
1.  Preliminary notification  - no  reactions  necessary 
2.  Notification  - reactions  not  expected 
3.  Notification  - reactions  necessary 
4.  Notification -full  reactions  necessary ATTACHMENT  3  CSource  19,101) 
Different groups  to be  alarmed  in  a major  accident 
PROFESSIONAL  GROUPS 
Group  I 
- authorities 
-public  services 
- private fire  brigades 
Group  II 
- rescue  forces 
- medical  services 
- water/electricity·supply 
VOLUNTEER  GROUPS 
Group  III 
- transport enterprises 
- civil  engineering  enterprises 
etc. 
Group  VI 
- scientists 
- engineers 
- experts 
Group  VII 
- information  services 
SPECIAL  GROUPS 
Group  IV 
- operator of  hazardous 
installations 
Group  V 
- persons  or facilities which 
need  special  protection ATTACHMENT  4 
Documents  which  shall  be  presented  and  published 
Cextract  from  the  Fourth  Ordinance  Implementing 
the  Federal  Immission  Control  Act)  Source  Ill I. 
Art.4  Type  and  amount  of  documents 
Cl)  The  application  shall  be  supplemented  by  documents  which  are 
required  in  order  to examine  the prerequisites to  the  licencing 
procedure. 
C2)  The  documents  shall  contain  information  on 
1.  engineering facilities which  are  necessary for  the operation 
of  the installation  as  well  as  auxiliary facilities which-
due  to  operational  requirements  - have  to  be  established  and 
operated  in  the  vicinity, 
2.  the  planned  process  including  necessary data  on  the 
identification of  the process  as  well  as  information  of  the 
kind  and  amount  of 
- substances  used, 
- intermediate products,  by-products  and  fi na 1 products, 
- waste  substances  produced, 
3.  perceivable  secondary  reactions  and  by-products  caused  by 
problems  in  the course  of  the  process, 
4.  type  and  extent  of  emissions  which  will  probably  be  caused  by 
the  installation;  type,  position  and  size of  emission  sources; 
distribution  of  emissions  over  space  and  time;  as  well  as 
conditions  at  the outlets, 
5.  planned  measures  on  the protection  against  harmful  effects  on 
the  environment,  especially measures  for  the  reduction  of 
emissions  as  well  as  measurements  on  emissions  and  immissions, 
6.  planned  measures  for  the  protection  of  the general  public  and 
immediate  neighbours  against  other dangers,  considerable 
disadventages  and  considerable  nuisance, 
7.  planned  measures  in  order  to  nuse  residual  substances  or  to 
dispose  waste, 
h.  planned  measures  in  the field of  occupational  safety and 
health. 
C2a)  Installations which  are  subject  to  the Hazardous  Incident 
Ordinance  and  which  are  listed in  Annex  I  to the  Hazardous 
Incident Ordinance  shall  require  a  safety analysis which  meets 
the  requirements  of  Article  7 of  the Hazardous  Incident 
Ordinance.  Sentence  1 shall  not  apply  if the  licencing  authority 
promises  the  applicant  in  writing  that  the  applicant  shall  be 
partially or  totally discharged  from  his  obligations  pursuant  to 
Articles  7 and  9 of  the  Hazardous  Incident Ordinance  in 
accordance  with  the  licence  granted  pursuant  to Article  10  of  the 
Hazardous  Incident  Ordinance. 
C3)  In  addition  to  the  documents  presented  in  accordance  with 
paragraph  1 the  applicant  shall  present  a clear  and  short 
description of  the  layout  of  the installation  and  perceivable 
effects  on  the  general  public  and  the neighbourhood.  He  shall 
also  present  a list of  the documents  included  in  the  application 
which  marks  those  documents  that  include  business  or  trade 
secrets. EMERGENCY 
Emergency 
Dear  Citizens, 
ATTACHMENT  5 
Information  to the  Public  CSource  Ill I) 
You  are  living  in  a city with  chemical  industry which  means  that you 
have  to  be  prepared  for  incidents  in  your  immediate  neighbourhood.  In 
such  a case you  have  to  bear  in  mind  certain  rules  of  behaviour  and 
certain measurs  to  protect yourself.  Please  keep  this leaflet for  an 
emergency  in  an  easily accessible  spot. 
The  Lord  Mayor EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
EMERGENCY 
If you  hear  about  an  incident  in  a  chemical  plant or  about  an  accident 
with  chemical  products  in  your  neighbourhood  which  has  an  effect  on 
the  environment,  please,  bear  in  mind  the following  rules.  You  will 
thus  help  to  improve  your  personal  protection  and  assistance provided 
for  the entire community. 
siren 
loudspeakers 
neighbours 
windows 
When  you  hear  the  siren  Chowling  sound  for 1 minute) 
turn  on  your  radio  CSUdwestfunk  I,  II  or  III,  or  ARD 
late-night  programme). 
Listen  to the  announcements  made  by  the fire brigade 
or  the  police. 
Inform  your  immediae  neighbours. 
Close  windows  and  doors. 
air-conditioning  Shut  off your  air-conditioning  and  ventilation 
systems. 
rooms 
outside 
doctor 
If possible  stay  in  rooms  at  the  upper  floors  which 
are  not  adjacent  to outside walls. 
Do  not  stay outside. 
In  case  of  health  problems  contact your  family 
doctor  or  doctors  on  emergency  duty. 
site of  accident  Do  not  approach  the  site of  the  accident  and  keep 
streets  and  roads  free for fire brigades,  police, 
etc. 
police 
telephone 
"all  clearH 
Follow  the  instructions  given  by  the police. 
Do  not  block  telephone  lines  to the fire  brigade, 
the police  and  rescue  services  asking  for 
information.  Call  only  if your  special  situation 
Cfire,  accident)  necessitates their help. 
Listen  to  the  Mall  clear·  announcements  made  over 
the  radio  or  by  the fire  brigade  or  the  police. 
Published  by  the office for  public  relations  of  the city of 
Ludwigshafen. ATTACHMENT  6 
DIE STADT K0LN INFORMIERT 
)  Verhalten bei 
I 
1 
~ 
1 
Wichtige lnformationen fUr lhre Sicherheit-
bitte aufmerksam lesen und aufbewahren 4Wiew.er.den$ieiUnterrichtef; ? 
• 
Bei Katastrophen, grof3eren Unglucksfollen und Terroranschlagen 
werden Sie durch geeignete Maf3nahmen alarmiert, wie z. B. 
~  Bekanntmachungen in Rundfunk und Fernsehen 
_.. durch die im Stadtgebiet installierten Sirenen 
~  durch Lautsprecherdurchsagen der Feuerwehr oder Polizei 
Wesentlich fUr aile Burger ist es, die Bedeutung der  verschiedenen 
Sirenensignale zu kennenl 
1  Minute Heulton 
~  2 x unterbrochener Dauerlon von einer Minute 
~  2 x unterbrochener Dauerton von einer Minute, 
nach 12 Sek. Dauerlon von einer Minute 
Rundfunkgerat einschalten -
auf Durchsagen achten 
Feueralarm 
-".  . - .  .  - - . . . - .  -- .; ~ '·  .•  --~:. 
Katastrophenalarm 
_.......--
'4WennSieselbsteiriScha-denser.eJgnismelden~ennen:Sie·! 
_.. Ort des Ereignisses 
(StroBe, Hausnummer, Stadtteil) 
_..Ereignis 
(welche Person en oder Sa chen sind betroffen, 
AusmaB, Ursachen) 
~  lhren Namen 
\Wich~ge1relefonnummemiinKoln:l 
Feuerwehrruf 
Rettungsdienste 
Notarzt 
Rettungshubschrauber 
Polizei-Notruf 
112 
112 
112 
112 oder 24 24 24 
110 
Stadtverwaltung  (Information)  221-1 
Hausarzt ........................................................  . 
Krankenhaus .................................................  . 
Apotheke ......................................................  . 
) !r.l~- --~'  ) 
u~Ei"%-Si.ch e rh e it r-------------
) 
:AI,genieine\Vemaltensr.e,geln! 
_.... Bleiben Sie zu Hause oder am Arbeitsplatz, und achten Sie 
auf Lautsprecherdurchsagen von Feuerwehr und Polizei und Rund-
funkdurchsagen. 
_...Kinder sofort in's Haus rufen! Donn sind sie unter Aufsicht 
und konnen nicht durch Unwissenheit falsch reagieren . 
.  ~  Helfen Sie alteren oder behinderten Nachbarn 
und StraBenpassanten! 
~  Venneiden Sie, daB die Einsatzkrafte bei Branden und Unglucks-
fallen durch Schaulustige behindert werden! 
Polizei, Feuerwehr und Hilfsorganisationen sind auf freie StraBen 
angewiesen. Wenn Sie nicht selbst helfen konnen, bleiben Sie 
dem Schadensort fern, und blockieren Sie keine Verkehrswege! 
~  Telefonleitungen nicht blockieren! 
Feuerwehr, Polizei und betroffene Untemehmen benotigen iede 
Telefonleitung zum Einleiten von Hilfs- und Rettungsmaf3nahmen; 
deshalb dort nur im Notfall anrufenl 
~  Auch wenn Sie nicht unmiHelbar betroffen sind, konnen Sie 
durch lhr besonnenes Verhalten wirkungsvoll zu einer 
schnelleren Gefahrenabwehr und Schadensbeseitigung beitragenl 
~Den  besten Schutz finden Sie in einem geschlossenen Gebaude! 
Fenster und Turen schlieBen, Klimaanlagen abschalten! 
So konnen Gase ausgeschlossen bleiben und nicht ungehindert 
in die Wohnung gelangen. 
~  Obere Stockwerke aufsuchen! 
Viele Gase sind schwerer als  Luft. 
Desholb sind hoher gelegene Raume im allgemeinen sicherer! 
~  Nasse Tucher bereitfegen! 
Vor Mund und Nose gehalten, konnen Sie Beeintrochtigungen 
der Atmung vennindem! 
~  Lautsprecherdurchsagen beachten! 
Feuerwehr und Polizei informieren Sie uber erforderliche 
Verhaltensregeln durch Lautsprecherwagen! 
~  Radio einschalten! 
Meldungen uber den Storfall, Verhaltensregeln und Entwamung 
werden, soweit notwendig, ouch uber die regionolen Sender 
bekanntgegeben! 
f."':'<. PART  2 Project Manager: 
Compiled by: 
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Study of off-site Response 
to Accidents in the Federal 
Republic of Gemany 
Ordered by the European Atomic 
Energy Con1n1unity (Euratom) 
Contract no.  3~79-88-10 ED ISP D 
GUnther MUller 
Alan Miles 
Erika Moch 
GUnther MUller 
Rheinisch-Westfalischer Technischer Oberwachungs-Verein e.V. 
D- 4300 Essen I 
Vice President and Chief Technical Officer  Dr.-Ing. Siegfried Wiesner 
October 1990 - 1.1  -
Contents 
1  Final Report 
1.1  Introduction  - 1. 3  -
1.2  Statutory Bodies involved  - 1. 5  -
1.3  Sources of Information  - 1. 6  -
1.4  Explanation of Form  - 1. 8  -
1.5  General Comments on Cases  -1.11-
1.6  Final Conclusions  -1.13-
1.7  Recommendations for further Procedure  - 1.14-
*  2  Cases 
2.  1  Case No  700409  - 2.  1.1 -
2.2  Case No  790206  - 2. 2.1 -
2. 3  Case No  791001  - 2. 3.1 -
2.4  Case No  800508  - 2. 4.1 -
2.5  Case No  820908  -2.5.1-
2.6  Case No  830125  - 2. 6.1 -
2. 7  Case No  830215  - 2. 7.1 -
2. 8  Case No  830803  - 2. 8.1 -
2.9  Case No  850118  -2.9.1-
2.10  Case No  860626  - 2.10.1 -
...  -. 
2.11  Case No  861223  - 2.11.1  -
2.12  Case No  8905lg  -2.12.1-
*Note:  Only  pages  7  (descriptions  of  accident/emergency/disaster)  and 
10  (conclusions  drawn)  are  herewith  presented. - 1.2 -
3  Appendices 
3.1  Appendix 1:  Keys  - 3.  1  -
3.2  Appendix 2:  Registers  - 3. 6  -
3.2.1  Chronology  - 3. 6  -
3.2.2  Places of events, alphabetical  - 3. 7  -
3.2.3  Substances involved  - 3. 8  -
3.2.3.1  alphabetical  -3. 8  -
3.2.3.2  UN No  -3.10-
3.2.3.3  CAS No  - 3.11 -
3.2.3.4  Total formula  - 3.12 -
4  References  - 4.  1 -
5  Sample  Data  Collection form  -5.1-- 1.3 -
1.1  Introduction 
The Council Directive of the European Communities of 24 June 1982 on the major-
accident hazards of cenain industrial activities (82/501/EEC) also known  under the 
designation "Seveso-Directive" obliges the states of the European Community to ta-
ke precautions 
- to prevent major accidents 
- to cope with large-scale emergencies 
- to provide the means for limiting the consequences of major accidents and finally 
- to mitigate an impact on  the public. 
This obligation is expressed in anicle 7, No  I with the words: 
The Member States  shall  set  up  or appoint  the  competent authority or authorities 
who, account being taken of the  responsibility of the manufacturer, are responsible 
for: 
- ensuring that an emergency plan  is drawn  up for action outside the establishment 
in respect of whose industrial activity notification has been given. 
- ... to provide the means for limiting the consequences thereof. 
The establishment of an emergency plan demands a wide range of 
laws, regulations and instructions 
- clear organizational frameworks to build up a functioning management system 
and to link up all response groups in a suitable way 
- knowledge of appropriate equipment and means 
- various expens in the fields of: 
- organization 
- fire-fighting 
- rescue operations 
- medical care 
- communication systems 
-chemistry - police matters 
and so on. 
- 1.4 -
An  indispensible tool  however,  when  emergency response plans are  to  be establis-
hed, is experience gained with former accidents. Up to now a variety of publications 
have appeared on the subject of major accidents [1, 2, 3, 4]. These normally present 
the facts of what happened in a lucid and brief way. But there is throughout a gap in 
the  details  given of the  countermeasures. It  is  precisely these, however, which are 
decisive points of interest when  setting  up  an  emergency response plan as  well  as 
when a major accident has occurred. The above mentioned tool can be characterized 
by the term: 
"exchange of experience". 
There is a real  need to  list and classify those measures and countermeasures which 
had to be taken  by the authorities and  the response groups to cope with specific ha-
zardous situations. 
With this in mind, initially 12 cases which occured in the FRG are to be looked at as 
a first step to closing the gap of information which is urgently needed by organizers 
of response  planning  as  well  as  by  responders.  Living without risks  is  simply  not 
possible, but  good and  comprehensive  information can suppon responders in  their 
decision-making in  the field  of disaster relief an  in mitigating and limiting the con-
sequences of hazards. 
This study is intended to fill  the gap and to promote the exchange of experience par-
ticularly with respect to questions such as: 
- which dangerous substances have caused a major accident I hazardous situation ? 
- which types of impact have arisen off-site ? 
- in which way was emergency I accident response prepared? 
- what types of organizations have been assigned? 
- how many men  where assigned ? 
-what was the personal protective clothing? 
- which vehicles, means, equipment, agents were applied? 
- what was the time sequence for the assignment of the response groups ? 
- how was the public informed ? 
- what lessons can  be learned by the specific case ? - 1.5  -
1.2  Statutory Bodies involved 
To perfonn this  study it  was  necessary  to  contact a large number of authorities re-
sponsible for questions of disaster response or directly involved in response measu-
res.  To achieve acceptance and  to  avoid problems  with  local authorities we  staned 
by making contact with high-level statutory bodies such as: 
- Federal Agency for Civil Defence 
- State Ministries of the Interior 
- District Governments 
- Gennan Association of Fire  Brigades. 
While working on the different cases we  built up personal contacts with the respecti-
ve statutory bodies at the place of the event. These were: 
- Major Disaster Protection Authorities 
- Police Headquaners 
- Municipal Fire Brigades 
- Voluntary Fire Brigades (outside larger towns) 
- Work Fire Brigades. 
The latter are also statutory bodies. This is based on the acts of the different states in 
the FRG governing fire  brigades, fire  protection, disaster response and special servi-
ces  [5].  Under these acts work  fire  brigades are entitled to perform their tasks with 
the powers of authorities. - 1.6-
1.3  Sources of Information 
Information on major accidents or imminent danger situations which  ~e  of interest 
for this study was gathered from  different sources as listed below. In an initial over-
view we studied publications such as: 
- newspapers 
national newspapers e.g 
Die Welt 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
Handelsblatt 
Si.iddeutsche Zeitung 
regional newspapers according to places where accidents or serious situations oc-
curred and to those editions which reported on the relevant facts 
- manuals 
the useful manuals include: 
C.H. Vervalin [4] 
Fire Protection Manual for Hydrocarbon Precessing Plants 
UBA [1] 
Major Accidents .l\1anual 
UBA [3] 
Documentation on  Disturbances in  Industrial Plants or involving dangerous 
Substances 
Due for publication in the near funure 
- specialist journals 
the most informative and therefore most used journals are: 
Bevolkerungssch u  tz-.l\1agazi n 
Brandhilfe 
brandschutz I Deutsche Feuenvehr-Zeitung 
Brandschutz in  Rheinland-Pfalz Fire International 
Gefahrliche Ladung 
- 1.7 -
112 Magazin fur den Feuerwehr-Mann 
Schweizerische Feuerwehr-Zeitung 
VFDB, Zeitschrift fur Forschung und Technik im Brandschutz 
Zivilsch  utz-Magazin 
Zivilverteidigung 
- reports 
reports dealing with special major accidents, for example in a particular case 
the Report of the BASF Work Fire Brigade or reports dealing with different cases 
such as Report of Hazardous Incident Commission, FRG 19.09.1984. 
To study reports, articles and I or brochures only available for examination in ar-
chieves we had to contact some institutions at different places. These include: 
- Bundesamt fur Zivilschutz 
Federal Agency for Civil Defence 
- Kathastrophenschutzschule des Bundes 
Federal Disaster Control Academy 
- Landesfeuerwehrschule 
Fire Brigade Academy 
- Schweizerischer Feuerwehrverband 
Swiss Fire Brigades Association. 
The most imponant and essential  sources of information, however, have been the 
personal contacts with  those  bodies engaged in  the response measures. With these 
contacts we gathered verbal infon11ation as  well as insights into assignment reports. 
In some cases we inspected the place of the event and obtained vivid descriptions by 
the officer in charge of the case in  question. The bodies we contacted w.ere  some of 
those listed in chapter 2:  Statutory Bodies involved. In the forms these types of in-
formation are marked: P.I. =personal infonnation, point 11, page 13. - 1.8 -
1.4  Explanation of Form 
The fonns used to describe the off-site response measures are designed to ensure a 
concise, clear and comprehensive survey of all those facts significant for the respon-
se measures. The infonnation given on the fonns is intended to feed a database. The 
facts are divided into eleven catagories. 
Catagory 1 identifies the case to date by the letter D, indicating a Gennan case, and 
a number which is made up of the date in reverse order. Later, when the study is 
continued, the letter D will be replaced by CH for Switzerland or A for Austria. 
Catagory 2 includes the date and place of the event, the time of the alarm, the type 
of activity during which the accident happened and up to three of the hazardous sub-
stances involved in  the event, either because they were present before the event or 
they were produced in the course of the event. 
The substances are characterized as follows: 
- chemical name or names in  English 
- chemical fonnula 
- chemical abstract service registry number 
- identification number, preceded by UN  No 
- hazard class number, Kemler-number 
the first figure indicates the main danger e.g.: 
2  gases 
3  flammable and combustible liquids 
4  flammable solids 
5  oxidizers 
6  poisons 
8  corrosive agents 
the second and third figures indicate additional dangers. If there is an X before 
the figures there is a danger in combination with water 
- hazchem code 
the hazchem code gives infonnation under the following headings: 
-fire fighting number: 1 =jets 
2 =fog 
3 =foam 
4 =dry agent 
- personal protection 
P, R, W, X= full protection 
- 1.9-
S, D],T, O,Y, a, Z, f) =closed-circuit breathing apparatus 
- evacuation 
E = consider evacuation 
- action to be taken 
P, R, S , T demand for dilution 
W, X, Y, Z demand for containment of released substance or substance plus 
extinguishing water 
- violent reaction 
possible violent reaction is indicated by letter V. 
The type of the accident I disaster under review is signified by one or more of the 
terms in the last box of catagory 2.  Imminent danger means in this case: quasi dan-
ger, imagined risk. In this case there is no real danger to the public. 
Catagory 3 lists the potential hazards of the substance, the situation, the sequence of 
events, but not the real danger which actually occurred. 
Catagory 4 and 5 list the impacts off- and on-site which actually occurred. 
Catagory 6  illustrates  the  accident preparedness  based on the requirements of the 
Hazardous Incident Ordinance, Storfall-Verordnung, and I or on the statutory cont-
ingency planning and the precautions of the fire-brigades. 
Catagory 7 describes in  concise form  some facts of the accident which have to be 
known to understand the description of the countermeasures. 
Catagory 8, catagory 9 and catagory I  0 present the most important information with 
respect to the characterisation of this study. 
Catagory 8 specifies in  detail  the  assigned personnel, bodies, vehicles, equipment, - 1.10-
means an agents and gives a rough overview of the countermeasures. 
Category 9 deals with the care for the public, especially with respect to information. 
Category  10 points out what  the  case,  the  actions and the result of all responses 
show. In relation to the remark that every chemical accident can be used to improve 
the precautions, as mentioned in chapter 1, this category grants the most effective in-
fonnation. 
Category 11  finally lists the sources of infonnation for those users of this study who 
require additional knowledge of the case under review. -1.11-
1.5  General Comments on Cases 
The study contains 12 cases selected with a view to covering a wide range of critical 
situations, preferably those caused by hazardous substances. 
Major criteria in the selection were: 
- the range of occurences should represent: 
release 
fire 
explosion 
environmental pollution 
imminent danger 
- unexpected or very new occurences 
- examplary precautions 
- new methods of attack 
- response measures which are of special interest, and which have been characteri-
sed by extreme expenditure of personnel, equipment, means 
- assignment of special operational units (e.g. task force, TUIS). 
In particular the cases are typified as follows: 
release  case no 
explosion and fire  cases no 
major fire  cases no 
700409 
790206 
830215 
860626 
790206 
791001 
820908 
890518 -1.12-
new method of attack  case no 
examplary precaution  case no 
epidemic danger  case no 
environmental pollution  cases no 
assignment of special units  case no 
puncture of a presurized gas-tanker  case no 
imminent danger  case no 
861223 
850118 
830803 
791001 
830803 
830125 
800508 
830125. 
The cases are described in a way which makes it possibele to collect data simply on 
the assigned men, vehicles, equipment, the  countermeasures, the activities perfor-
med, point 8, and point 9 Care for the Public. Particularly attention is drawn to the 
comparison between advance contingency preparedness and the countermeasures ta-
ken in the event, point 10, Conclusions drawn. Finally in each case it is worked out 
what lessons can be  learned from  this event. This is  in  accordance with the  basic 
principle of this study: to offer a reality-based support for all endeavours in establis-
hing emergency response plans, in improving the preplanned countermeasures and I 
or in finding the appropriate and correct decisions when the event has occurred, and 
do this by the exchange of experience. • 
-1.13-
1.6  Final Conclusions 
As we know from experience, responders often need many hours to cope with what 
happened or went wrong in  the first 20 minutes. To improve the effects of the first 
responders within the first few minutes after the alarm has been given, it is essential 
that their decisions and assignments be based on experience gained with hazardous 
situations in the past, either by themselves or especially by others. This study should 
be regarded as a first step in  providing the responding groups with comprehensive 
information on: 
how an appropriate emergency preparedness can be established 
- which vehicles, equipment and agents have to be kept ready for specific assign-
ments 
- how the logistical problems were managed at the scene 
- how many personnel were needed to cope with specific situations 
- what has to be done in special situations under similar conditions. 
In preplanning activities the  knowledge gained from earlier response measures will 
help ensure that  the  off-site  emergency  plans and  the  on-site plans are  mutually 
compatibel. 
Initial operations in case of an emergency are determined essentially by the time fac-
tor. A  collection of response descriptions published in a  suitable context will help 
minimize and mitigate the consequences of any major accident I hazardous situation. 
It will  enable the  responders  to  save  time  by  taking correct decisions after being 
alerted. 
While preparing this study we  encountered an increasing acceptance on the part of 
the bodies we contacted.  This was  based on the recognition that the results of any 
endeavours may help to improve precautions and assignment activities. According 
to the principle that every major hazard I hazardous situation can help_ to improve 
the countermeasures, we  made excellent contacts for our work.  In  view of this  we 
can state that this  study, seen  as  a feasibility  study,  has confirmed the expectation 
that the large scale collection of response reports can be successfully conducted. - 1.14-
1.7  Recommendations for further Procedure 
As we progressed with the study, it became clear to us that the following is impor-
tant with regard to our further endeavours: 
- this study is now under discussion by  all bodies concerned with questions of re-
sponse to  hazardous situations.  On  the one hand,  this  is  based on our personal 
contacts, on the other on informative events e.g. conferences, discussions, review 
meetings and I or personal contacts within these bodies. 
- the bodies mentioned showed great interest in obtaining the results and in the de-
tails of the study, which  is  ro  be  published as  an additional tool for planning or 
improving precautions and as  a basis for decision-making in an actual hazardous 
situation. 
- experts  in  major accident  response  management  expect  that  the  collection  of 
countermeasure repons will  be pursued without delay on a larger scale, and even 
across national frontiers. 
To achieve  optimum  benefit  from  this  study  and  from  those  established in  other 
countries, we recommend the following procedure: 
- the reports of countermeasures taken  to  date,  should be  published immediately. 
Publication may be in the form of loose-leaf collection. That would offer the pos-
sibility of supplemention and I or to updating the collection subsequently without 
difficulty.  In  addition  these  reports  should be  stored in  a database.  In  any case, 
the reports should be  made available to all  those bodies concerned with response 
measures. 
- the  Joint  Research  Centre  should  promote  the  presenting of papers on  this  sub-
ject. The aim  has  to  be  to arose interest in  this information system on a broad ba-
sis, to create acceptance at different levels of the bodies concerned and to promo-
te assistance for further endeavours in this field. 
- the  study  and  the  establishment  of countermeasure reports  in  relation  to  actual 
events  should  be  extended  to  the  five  new  states  of the  FRG.  Moreover they 
should cover our neighbouring countries Switzerland and Austria. 
In the course of the study we  have made exellent contacts in Germany. We are in a 
position to commence similar activities \Vithout delay in particular  in Switzerland 
.. , 
-1.15-
and Austria, and also in the United States. We could start with corresponding activi-
ties immediately. To maintain our contacts, activities aimed at extending the collec- ~ 
tion of  cases should be initiated at the earliest opportunity. -2.1.7- 0- 700409 
7..  Description of accident I emergency 1 disaster 
Impact on the public 
Source of danger: 
Weather conditions: 
yes  0  no  0  unobt.  0 
by  mistake the connection hose of a tank car carrying chlorohydric 
acid was connected to a tank containing  sodium hydroxide solution 
wind of west 
Short description of development of accident: 
hydrochlorid acid reacted with sodium hydroxide SQ.lution to form 
chlorine gas which was released 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
9.14  alarm 
9.16  employment of fire brigade 
10.45  all clear - 2 2.7- ·:.  - 790206 
7.  Description of acc.c~nt :emergency · dis:lster 
Impact on the public  yes  0  no  0  unobt.  0 
Source of danger:  presumably short circuit 
Weather conditions:  temperature  ·3 ·c: slight wind; overcast, fog, wind from the east 
Short description of development of accident: 
-faulty r·  rrent cable caused fire  ,.. 
- fire cau .;:-2d dust explosion 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
06.02.: 21.27  alarm 
21 .  30  assignment of 4 engine companies 
21 .  50  assignment of additional engine companies 
22.15  assignment of 2 fire-fighting boats, water supply by 
the pumps of the fire-fighting boats and by a high-
pressure main 
23.30  assignment of BW bulldozer tanks 
07.02.: 17.20  a rescue dog team started search. operations 
12.04.: 17.00  all clear . 2.3 7- D-791001 
7.  Description of accident I emer: 2ncy  dis3ster 
Impact on the public  yes  0  no  0  unobt.  D 
Source of danger:  presumably '.Vt:?lding work 
Weather conditions:  cloudless. warm, slight wind from southwest 
Short description of development of accident: 
a tank farm in a port was set on fire after explosion of fuel oil tanks: 
a major conflagration followed 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
10.41  alarm 
10.45  fire brigade turned up on scene 
10.50  fire attack 
15.41  all clear . 2  <-!  7. 
7.  Description of accident i  emergE·r.:i  ·J~sast;r 
Impact on the public  yes  D  no  0  unobt.  D 
Source of danger:  pressurised gas tanker 
Weather conditions:  dry, cloudy, wind from north 
Short description of development of accident: 
during shunting operations in a marshalling yard ~.9 tankers contai-
ning vinyl chloride crashed: one tanker was punctured by a buffer; vi-
nyl cllloride released and exploded immediately after being ignited 
by an electric arc of the overhead line 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
10.34  operation control center of  the fire brigade watched fire and 
smoke 
10.35  one engine company started on sight without an alarm having 
been sounded 
10.40  fire brigade reached scene of conflagration 
1 1.1 0  fire brigade was informed on the nature of the hazardous 
good 
1  1.50  all clear -.  - ... 
•  .I- "'  - ...  '  0- 820908 
7.  , Description of accident • emerge: icy  <.Jis:.a::;ter 
Impact on the public  yes  0  no  0  unobt.  0 
Source of danger:  leak in a mdh3nol pipe-line 
Weather conditions:  easterly wind. wind velocity 3 ... 5 mlsec 
Short description of development of accident: 
release of methanol due to a leak in a pipe-line aRd ignition most 
probJbty by a short circuit in a cable 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
11.28  alarm 
1  1  .31  fire attack 
1  1  .33  alert stage 4 
1  1  .42  alert stage 6 
1  1  .45  predisaster warning 
1  1  .55  OEC arranged 
12.00  EOC manned 
13.20  fire under control 
15.54  all clear - 2 -:  7-
7.  Description of accident i  emc:··~ · ::  :~~~  d:~:::s~er 
Impact on the public  yes  0  no  0  unobt.  0 
Source of danger:  derailed pressurised gas tank car 
Weather conditions:  damp and co:d. tight rain 
Short description of development of accident: 
a pressurised gas tank car derailed in a marshalli,Dg yard during 
shunting operations; the derailment was caused by inadvertent 
operation of points 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
3.06  alarm 
16.00  evacuation 
16.40  star1 of salvage operations 
19.40  all clear D- 830215 
1.  Description of accident i eme1gency  <.1i~~"£ter 
Impact on the public  yes  D  no  0  unobt.  0 
Source of danger:  exp!osion of  a pump recipient 
Weather conditions:  overc:tst. ligt1t  •t.~ind 
Short description of development of accident: 
- pollution by anorganic salt has caused a thermaL-decomposition of 
anthracenedione 
- recipient exploded 
-released thermooil, diphyl, was set on fire 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
3.38  fire attack 
9.00  ~~~clear - 2.8.7- - - 330803 
7.  Description of accident 1 emergency 1 disast;!:-
Impact on the public  yes  0  no  D  unobt.  0 
Source of danger:  arson 
Weather conditions:  bright, warm 
Short description of development of accident: 
-fire in ,-, ... ;'ehouse with cold-storage plant, 6,200 t butter, 3,000 t 
meat were stored 
- extent of fire to entire warehouse and cold storage plant 
- damage to ammonia evaporator 
- release of molten butter 
- disturbance to public 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
0.56  alarm 
1  .01  assignment of 2 engine companies 
1  .21  assignment of 4 additional engine companies and of 2 
fireboats 
3.03  fire-fighting operations by 9 engine companies 
11.30  fire unter control 
additional fire-fighting operations over a period of 17 days - 2.9.7- D- 850118 
7.  .  Description of accident 1 emergency 1 disaster 
Impact on the public  yes  0  no  0  unobt.  0 
Source of danger:  explosion in the distillation unit of an ethylene plant 
Weather conditions:  frost, -6 ·c 
Short description of development of accident: 
a release of gas was followed by an explosion of the gas cloud; 
this caused a major fire 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
15.42  alarm 
15.4  7  fire attack 
17.10  fire under control 
17.28  all clear ·2.107-
7.  Description of accident 1 emerger<:!  :iisas~er 
Impact on the public  yes  0  no  D  unobt.  0 
Source of danger:  ignition of vapour by static charge 
Weather conditions:  light north-easterly wind, 30 ·c. hot dry weather 
Short description of development of accident: 
after loading of a tanker with benzene a sample was to be taken; due 
to incorrect behaviour of the sample-taker benzene vapour ignited 
causing an explosion and ensuing fire 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
14.35  alarm 
14.38  fire brigade on scene, fire attack 
14.44  cooling of the harbour tanks 
14.53  engagement of an firte-fighting boat 
17.09  all clear • 
-2117- 0  - 861223 
7.  Description of accident I (;mergency i disaster 
Impact on the public 
Source of danger: 
Weather conditions: 
yes  0  no  D  unobt.  0 
leaking pressure gas road tanker 
winter weather, temperature around freezing point, light easterly 
wind, snow-fall 
Short description of development of accident: 
tanker was about to fill a stationary LPG tank when the connection 
hose fractured; propane escaped forming a gas cloud covering an 
area of 500m2 with a higth of 1 m 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
13.47  alarm 
14.06  evacuation of neighbouring houses, turning off of heating fa-
cilities, attack with diffuser spray nozzle 
15.06  measuring of propane concentration in the air in the village 
and on an open field 
19.00  all clear . 2., 2 7. 
7.  Description of accident I emer2c ,.t:  . .  :  . d:saster 
Impact on the public 
Source of danger: 
yes  D 
release of butane 
ignition of gas cloud 
~-890518 
no  0  unobt.  D 
Weather conditions:  cloud-free. warm, slight wind from eastsoutheast 
Short description of development of accident: 
during repair work on a pipe containing butane, butane was re-
leased and ignited, this escalated into a major fire involving diffe-
rent sorts of hydrocarbons 
Time sequence for decisions of actions taken: 
8.51  alarm 
8.56  fire attack 
9.03  call in additional operational units 
9.15  establishment of OEC 
13.00  all clear 
... -2.1.12- D- 700409 
1  o.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness  yes  no 
Which measures I means:  D 
- stock of a sufficient number of closed-circuit breathing apparatus with full face masks 
-wind cone 
- better marking of tanks and mains for dangerous materials 
Lessons learned: 
fire brigade is to be informed very soon of the kind of dangerous substances 10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compare·j ::.tr1  contingency preparedness: 
-external aid had to be called 1n 
- BW bulldozer tanks 
- rescue dog team 
Need for additional preparedness  yes 
Which measures I means: 
- extensive actions call for a well equipped mobile command center 
Lessons learned: 
- ~; ~0206 
no 
D 
- in the case of a major and long-term fire an additional Nater supply from high-pressure 
mains and I or fireboats are essential - 2 3 12-
10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken comporo:?d  :. i!rl cont.ngency preparedness: 
-additional water was provided ·::ith the J,d of fire boats 
- additional operational un1ts  ':.-ere to  be cJIIed m immediately 
Need for additional preparedness  yes 
Which measures I means:  D 
Lessons learned: 
for fire fighting operations in tank farms are to be kept ready: 
- sufficient foam 
- a number of oil booms 
0-791001 
no 
moreover one or more fire-fighting boats should be to call in immediately 10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared :<lin cont1ngency preparedness: 
water supply of the marshall:ng yard 'N3S insufficient to cope with a major fire 
Need for additional preparedness  yes  no 
Which measures I means:  D 
-water supply on the marshalling yard is to be increased 
- plans of sewage systems hare to be available 
- marshalling yards should be m3de more accessible 
Lessons learned: 
technical assistance. e.g. by TUtS. is inevitable in the case of a critical situation with hazar-
dous materials • 
.. 
10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared ·:.1th  conLr.go;;ncy preparedness: 
- special disaster response pl:tn en3bled etfective employment 
- availability of  a car with g:1s detectton equipment 
Need for additional preparedness  yes 
Which measures 1 means: 
-coordination of warning text between f1re  brigades and police 
-detailed description of the storage of dangerous goods with updating 
Lessons learned: 
0- 820908 
no 
D 
-a good cooperation between municipal fire brigade and works tire brigade was based on a 
joint drill 3 months before 
-warning texts must be coordinated between police and fire brigade 
-special gas-measure equipment for quick action is to be kept ready 10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken comparc.j :. ,;t,  ~cnt.ngency preparedness: 
this event confirmed the inoispenS1bil1ty of TUIS in particular situations 
Need for additional preparedness  yes  no 
Which measures 1 means:  D 
Lessons learned: 
the provision of empty tank cars is difficult and time consuming • 
.!.  7-,2 ..  D - 830215 
10.  Conclusions dra\vn 
Countermeasures taken comp3red :.•tn cont1ngency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness  yes  no 
Which measures I means:  D 
hydraulic platform for fire figtt1ing puposes in higths exceeding 30 m without need for indoor 
fire attrack 
Lessons learned: . 2.8.12 -
10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
- extinguishing water could not be collected 
. ?:0803 
- communication system of response groups was interferred with a foreign transmitter; 
transmission frequency had to be changed 
- capacity of animal carcass utilisation plants was not sufficient 
- water supply was supported by the pumps of two fireboats 
Need for additional preparedness  yes  no 
Which measures I means: 
- preventive  fire protection of warehouses has to be worked out with respect to 
- fire sectors, party walls, fire doors 
- limitation of fire load 
-smoke-flue pipes, heat remc·  ...  -~1 pipes 
- smoke detectors 
- access to warehouses from all sides for fire engines is essential 
D 
-provision of facilities to supply waterways, streams, rivers in special cases with oxygen to 
keep fish alive 
Lessons learned: 
- alarmregister must include 
- addresses of animal carcass utilisation plants up to greater distances 
- addresses for suction cars and cleaning facilities 
- possibilities for combatting rats or other health hazards 
- warehouses are to be equipped with a sufficient number of pillar hydrants and 1  or ground 
hydrants 
- cleaning companies must be on standby 24 hours • 
·2.9.12- 0-850118 
10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness  yes  no 
Which measures I means:  0 
- setting up of an extinguishing water collection basin 
- improved information to the public in case of a dangerous situation 
- special letter to inform the public: new edition 
Lessons learned: 
- in case of an accident an immediate alarm from the company management should be 
given to the municipal fire brigade 
- mutual aid and technical assistance by neighbouring WFsO was necessary ·2.1012-
10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared w1th contingency preparedness: 
usuable equipment was available such as: 
- mobile monitors 
- wooden oil booms 
- plastic oil booms 
Need for additional preparedness  yes 
Which measures I means: 
no 
D 
-marking of inland tankers carrying dangerous goods with orange warning plates which 
display hazard class number and UN - No 
- inclusion of the harbour loading and unloading installations in the stationary protective 
system 
Lessons learned: 
-staff ist to be trained regularly in the use of stationary fire extinguishing installations 
- fire practices supervised by the fire brigade should be performed annually 
• -2.11.12- 0  - 861223 
10.  ·Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared wi1h contingency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness  yes  no 
Which measures 1 means:  D 
Lessons learned: 
expulsion of an explosive gas cloud by spray is very efficient: to avoid injuries to the firefigh· 
ters full protection suits must be worn -2.12.12-
10.  Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
- sufficient water supply by a great number of pillar hydrants 
-additional water was provided with the aid of fireboats 
Need for additional preparedness  yes 
Which measures 1 means:  D 
Lessons learned: 
no 
fireboc;..ts were temporary on radio set of 2m-band unattainable. This was caused by the 
hight of a steel-armed jetty-wall and by the steeltanks which reflected the radio waves - 3. I  -
3.1  Appendix 1:  Keys 
In the forms are used abbreviations or keys for some terms. Some of these are inter-
national usual, some are speci:.ll keys  in Germany. 
The abbreviations I keys are: 
A 
AL 
ASB 
B 
BF 
BLEVE 
BRK 
BW 
c 
CVE 
trailer ladder 
workers rescue service 
Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund-Deutschland e.V. 
professional fire  brigade 
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion 
Bavarian Red Cross e.V. 
Bayrisches Rotes Kreuz e. V. 
Ferderal Defence Forces 
Bundeswehr 
confined vapour explosion D 
DB 
DL 
DLK 
DRK 
E 
ELF 
ELW 
EOC 
F 
FF 
G 
GW 
GW-A 
German Federal Railway 
Deutsche Bundesbahn 
turntable ladder 
turntable ladder with basket 
German Red Cross e. V. 
Deutsches Rotes  Kreuz e. V. 
fire fighting conduct car 
mobile command center 
emergency operation center 
volunteer fire brigade 
tool and gear carrier 
breathing apparatus tender 
• H 
HB 
J 
JUH 
K 
Kdow 
KTW 
L 
LB 
LF 
M 
MTW 
N 
NAW 
'  NZZ 
0 
OEC 
....  ..... 
- -'·-' -
Handesblan 
Johanniter rescue service 
Johanniter-U nfall-Hilfe e. V. 
control unit 
ambulance 
turntable ladder with stage 
fire squad tender 
personnel carrier 
emergency ambulance 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung 
on-scene emergency center p 
P.I. 
PLF 
P250 
R 
RTW 
RW 
s 
s 
STF 
sw 
T 
THW 
TLF 
TroLF 
TroTLF 
TSA 
TUIS 
- 3.4  -
personal information 
dry powder tender 
dry powder trailer, 250 kg 
ambulance vehicle 
emergency tender 
foam-making nozzle 
foam agents vehicle 
hose carrier 
technical assistant service 
Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk 
pump water tender 
dry powder tender 
dry powder tank tender 
trailers for portable fire pumps 
Tmnsport Accident lnfonnation and Assistance System 
Transport- Unfall- Informations- und Hilfeleistungs-System 
• u 
UBA 
unobt. 
UVCE 
v 
VFDB 
w 
WAZ 
WF 
WLF 
WSP 
- 3.5  -
Federal Environmental Agency 
U  m  wdtbundes1.un t 
unobtainable 
unconfined vapour cloud explosion 
Journal for Research and Technics in Fire Protection 
Zeitschrift fUr  Forschung und.Technik im Brandschutz 
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 
works fire  brigade 
vehicles for fire-fighting purposes 
waterway police 
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3.2.1  Chronology 
Date  Case No  Place 
09.04.1970  700409  D- 6750 Kaiserslautem 
06.02.1979  790206  D - 2800 Bremen 
01.10.1979  791001  D- 4100 Duisburg 
08.05.1980  800508  D - 8500 Ni.irnberg 
08.09.1982  820908  D- 5000 Koln 
25.01.1983  830125  D - 4200 Oberhausen 
15.02.1983  830215  D- 2212 Brunsbilttel 
03.08.1983  830803  D - 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelms  burg 
18.01.1985  850118  D - 5047 Wesseling 
26.06.1986  860626  D - 6800 Mannheim 
23.12.1986  861223  D - 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld 
18.05.1989  890518  D - 2000 Hamburg - 3.7  -
3.2.2  Places of events, alphabetical 
Place  Case No 
D- 2800 Bremen  790206 
D- 2212 BrunsbUttel  830215 
D- 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld  861223 
D- 4100 Duisburg  791001 
D- 2000 Hamburg  890518 
D - 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg  830803 
D - 6750 Kaiserslautern  700409 
D- 5000 Koln  820908 
D - 6800 Mannheim  860626 
D - 8500 Ntimberg  800508 
D - 4200 Oberhausen  830125 
D- 5047 Wesseling  850118 3.2.3  Substances involved 
3.2.3.1  Arranged alphabetically 
Substance  Formula  Case No  Place 
Ammonia  NH3  830803  D- 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg 
Anthracenedione, 
1-nitro  Ct4H7N04  830215  D - 2212 Brunsblittel 
Benzene, Light 
oil, Phenylhyd.ride  C6H6  860626  D - 6800 Mannheim 
Butane  C4H10  890518  D - 2000 Hamburg 
Chlorine  Cl2  700409  D - 67 50 Kaiserslautem 
Crude oil  890518  D- 2000 Hamburg 
Diphyl  C12H100·C12H  10  830215  D- 2212 Brunsblittel 
Ethane  C2H6  850118  D - 5047 Wesseling 
Ethylene  C2H4  850118  D - 504 7 Wesseling 
Flour  790206  D - 2800 Bremen 
Gasoline  890518  D - 2000 Hamburg 
Grain  790206  D - 2800 Bremen 
Heavy fuel oil  791001  D - 4100 Duisburg 
Hydrochloric acid  HCl  700409  D - 67 50 Kaiserslautem 
Methanol  CH30H  820908  D- 5000 Koln 
Propane  C3Hs  861223  D- 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld Propylene, Propene, 
Methylethene  C3H6 
Sodium hydroxide  N  aOH 
Vinyl chloride 
. 3.9 . 
850118 
830125 
700409 
800508 
D- 5047 Wesseling 
D - 4200 Oberhausen 
D- 6750 Kaiserslautem 
D - 8500 Niimberg - 3.10-
3.2.3.2  Arranged according UN  No 
UN No  Case No  Place 
1005  830803  D - 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelms  burg 
1011  890518  D - 2000 Hamburg 
1017  700409  D - 6700 Kaiserslautem 
1035  850118  D - 504  7 Wesseling 
1077  850118  D - 504  7 W  esse  ling 
1077  830125  D - 4200 Oberhausen 
1086  800508  D - 8500 NUrnberg 
1114  860626  D - 6800 Mannheim 
1115  890518  D - 2000 Ham burg 
1230  820908  D- 5000 Koln 
1267  890518  D - 2000 Ham  burg 
1789  700409  D - 67 50 Kaiserslautem 
1823  700409  D - 67 50 Kaiserslautem 
1962  850118  D - 504  7 W  esseling 
-. 
1978  861223  D- 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld - 3.11  -
3.2.3.3  Arranged according CAS 1\o 
CAS No  Substance  Case No  Place 
67- 56- 1  Methanol  820908  D- 5000 Koln 
71-43-2  Benzene, Light oil, 
Phenylhydride  860626  D - 6800 Mannheim 
74- 84-0  Ethane  850118  D - 504  7 W  esseling 
74- 85- 1  Ethylene  850118  D- 5047 Wesseling 
74- 98- 6  Propane  861223  D- 6912 Dielheim-Balzfeld 
75-01-4  Vinyl chloride  800508  D - 8500 Ntimberg 
82- 34- 8  Anthracenedione, 
1-nitro  830215  D - 2212 Brunsbtittel 
106- 97- 8  Butane  890518  D - 2000 Hamburg 
115- 07- 1  Propylene, Propene, 
Methylethene  850118  D- 5047 Wesseling 
115-07- 1  Propylene, Propene, 
Methylethene  830125  D - 4200 Oberhausen 
1310- 73- 2  Sodium hydroxide  700409  D - 6750 Kaiserslautem 
7647-01-0  Hydrochloric acid  700409  D- 6750 Kaiserslautem 
7664-41-7  Ammonia  830803  D - 2000 Hamburg-Wilhelms  burg 
7782-50-5  Chlorine  700409  D - 67 50 Kaiserslautem 
8002-05-9  Crude oil  890518  D - 2000 Hamburg 
8004- 13- 5  Diphyl  830215  D - 2212 Brunsbtittel 
8006-61-9  Gasoline  890518  D - 2000 Hamburg  -. - :. 12  -
3.2.3.4  Arranged according total forntula 
Formula  Substance  CAS No  Case No 
CH30H  Methanol  67- 56- 1  820908 
C2H3Cl  Vinyl chloride  75- 01  - 4  800508 
C2H4  Ethylene  74- 85- 1  850118 
C2H6  Ethane  74- 84- 0  850118 
C3H6  Propylene, Propene, Methylethene  115 - 07- 1  850118 
830125 
C3Hs  Propane  74-98- 6  861223 
C4H1o  Butane  106-97- 8  890518 
C6H6  Benzene, Light oil, Phenylhyd.ride  71 - 43 - 2  860626 
Ct2Hto()·C12Hto  Diphyl  8004- 13- 5  830215 
Ct4H7N()4  Anthracenedione, 1-nitro  82- 34- 8  830215 
Cl2  Chlorine  7782-50-5  700409 
HCI  Hydrochloric acid  7647-01-0  700409 
NaOH  Sodium hydroxide  1310-73-2  700409 
NH3  Ammonia  7664-41 -7  830803 - -+. l  -
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Niedersachsisches Gesetz  Uber den  Brandschutz und die Hilfeleistungen der Feuer-
wehren 
Niedersachsen 
Gesetz tiber den Feuerschutz und die  Hilfeleistung bei UnglticksfzHlen  und offentli· 
chen Notstanden 
NW 
Landesgesetz  tiber den  Brandschutz, die  Allgemeine  Hilfe  und den  Katastrophen· 
schutz 
Rhld.-Pfalz 
Gesetz tiber den Feuerschutz im  Saarland 
Saar 
Gesetz tiber den Brandschutz und die Hiifeleistungen der Feuerwehren 
Schl.-H. 
r • 
.. 
5. 1 
Commission  of  the  European  Cornmunities 
JOINT 
RESEARCH 
CENTRE 
REPORT OF OFF·SITE RESPONSE MEASURES 
1.  Identification 
I  Case No.: 
2.  General Data 
Date, time of event 
Time of alarm 
Place 
Type of activity 
- industry 
type of industry 
- transport 
- storage 
- others 
Dangerous substances involved: 
1. Substance 
chemical name (s) 
formula 
CAS No. 
UN No:  Hazard class : 
- 1 -
RW"/UV 
0 
rail  0  road 0  others 0 
Hazchem Code: 
0 
0 2. Substance 
chemical name (s) 
formula 
CAS No. 
UN No: 
3. Substance 
chemical name (s) 
formula 
CAS No. 
UN No: 
5.2 
Hazard class : 
Hazard class : 
Type of accident/disaster: 
CVE  D  UVCE 
Hazchem Code: 
Hazchem Code: 
D  BLEVE 
fire  D  release  D  leakage 
other catastrophe  D  deflagration  D 
imminent danger  D 
Declaration of major disaster  yesD  noD 
- 2-
D 
D 
.. 5.3 
0-
3.  Potential hazard 
for man  yes  D  no  D 
poisoning  D  distress  D 
pressure wave  D  panic  D 
•  apparent danger  D  restriction of traffic  D 
injuries  D  fatal injuries  D 
evacuation  D  irritations  D 
burns  D  shock  D 
for environment  yes  D  no  D 
air pollution  D  water pollution  D 
soil pollution  D  vegetation poisoning  D 
demage to buildings  D  .  .  .  to traffic facilities  D 
- 3-5.4 
4.  ·Actual types of impact off-site 
for man  yes  D  no  D 
poisoning  D  distress  D 
pressure wave  D  panic  D 
apparent danger  D  restriction of traffic  D  • 
injuries  D  fatal injuries  D 
shock  D  evacuation  D 
• 
irritations  bums  D 
- respiratory  D 
- eyes  D 
- skin  D 
for environment  yes  D  no  D 
air pollution  D  water pollution  D 
soil pollution  D  vegetation poisoning  D 
damage to buildings  D  .  .  .  to traffic facilities  D 
• 
-4-5.5 
0-
5.  .  Actual· types· of impact in-site 
for man  yes  D  no  D  unobt.  D 
injuries  D  fatal injuries  0 
for plant  yes  D  no  D  unobt.  D  .. 
damage to buildings  D 
damage to process units  D 
damage to storage tanks  D 
damage to traffic facilities  D 
extent of damage  unobt.  D 
6.  Accident preparedness 
yes  no  unobt. 
D  D  D 
PlanVunit submitted to Hazardous Incident Ordinance  D  D  D 
Safety analysis established  D  D  D 
General emergency response plan established  D  D  D 
Special disaster response plan  in force  D  D  D 
Early warning system arranged  D  D  D 
reserved telephone line  to:  D  • 
radio connection  to:  D 
fire alarm  D 
- 5-6.  Accident preparedness continued 
yes  no  unobt. 
Fire brigade 
special countermeasure plan  D  D  D 
information on dangerous substances  D  D  D 
special response plan according to safety analysis  D  D  D 
assignment instructions  D  D  D 
kind of special equipment according to safety analysis  D  D  D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
EOC arrang.ed  D  D  D 
alert schedules prepared  D  D  D 
float-charts for decisions established  D  D  D 
disaster manual available  D  D  D 
preliminary estimation of hazardous area (plume spread model)  D  D  D 
plastic overlays  D  D  D 
other precautions:  D 
Informing the public in advance:  D  D  D 
D 
•  special letter 
special page in directory  D 
informational meeting  D 
-6-• 
• 
5.7 
7.  . Description of accident 1  emergency 1  disaster 
Impact on the public 
Source of danger: 
Weather conditions: 
yes  0 
Short description of development of accident: 
Time sequence .for decisions of actions taken: 
-7-
0-
no  0  unobt.  0 5.8 
D -
8.  Countermeasures 
yes  no  unobt. 
Assignment 
Species of organizations involved 
professional fire brigade  D  D  D 
D  D  D 
• 
works fire brigade 
industrial fire brigade  D  D  D  • 
police  D  D  D 
civil service I defence service  D  D  D 
voluntary organizations  D  D  D 
medical services  D  D  D 
FF  D 
D 
D 
Fire brigade 
vehicles: quantity and type (DIN) 
men  duration of assignment 
helicopter  D  fire-fighting boat  D 
means and agents 
branch pipes:  size (DIN) 
• 
quantity 
hydro-shield:  quantity 
monitors:  quantity 
foam  D  heavy  D  medium  D  light  D 
dry powder  D  D  D 
- 8-5.9 
D-
8.  Countermeasures continued 
- assessment of hazardous area: 
- detector tubes  D 
- explosimeter  D 
- plume spread modelling  D 
- plastic overlays  D 
- personal protective clothing: 
Police 
- men:  - vehicles: quantity: 
- kind of activity: 
yes  no 
- evacuation procedure  D  D 
- emergency route  D  D 
- inner core I outer ring  D  D 
- equipment 
Civil service I civil defence 
yes  no 
- EOC manned  D  D 
- OEC manned  D  D 
- kind of activity: 
-
- duration of assignment: 
-9-5.10 
D-
8.  Countermeasures continued 
Voluntary organizations 
- name(s): 
- kind of activity: 
Medical service(s) involved: 
Short description of countermeasures: 
Additional remarks: 
-10-5. 11 
D-
9.  Care for the public 
Actions for information 
Warning to the public 
time of warning  unobt.  D 
warning means 
..  long range loudspeakers  D 
sirens  D 
loudspeaker cars  D 
radio  D 
telephone hot lines  D 
others 
yes  no  unobt. 
Information on safe behaviour  D  D  D 
Means of information 
loudspeaker cars  D  D  D 
leaflets  D  D  D 
radio  D  D  D 
telephone hot lines  D  D  D 
Evacuation procedure  D  D  D 
selective evacuation  D  D  D 
general evacuation  D  D  D 
•  approximate number of evacuees 
- 11 -5. 12 
10.  · Conclusions drawn 
Countermeasures taken compared with contingency preparedness: 
Need for additional preparedness 
Which measures I means: 
Lessons learned: 
-12-
yes 
D 
:J-
no 
D 
• 5.13 
D-
11.  Source(s) of information 
., 
' 
-13-